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Lexical Entries for Verbs1 
1The ideas presented here owe much to conversations with J. T. 
Heringer, D. T. Langendoen, and D. L. Stampe, all of Ohio State 
University. 
1. A mature speaker of a language controls a great deal of highly 
specific information about the individual words which he uses in 
his own speech or which he perceives and interprets in the ling-
uistic productions of others. It is the task of the theory of 
lexis to characterize such information. In this paper, I shall 
inquire into the relevance, for the lexical description of English 
verbs, of certain well-understood concepts from the so-called 'predi-
cate calculus• of symbolic logic; I shall suggest areas where these 
notions will fail us in our attempts to capture certain logical 
and semantic properties of verbs; and I shall conclude by proposing 
ways in which a distinct order of concepts may be appealed to in 
describing the grammar and semantics of verbs. 
The words 'predicate' and 'argument' will be used in roughly 
the logician's sense. A predicate is a term which identifies 
some property of an object or some relation between two or more 
objects. The objects concerning which a predicate asserts some-
thing are the arguments of that predicate. 2 
2r believe that for the purposes of this essay, certain impreci-
sions may be allowed in the use of logical terms. In particular, I 
shall not require myself to be careful about distinguishing 'predi-
cate' from 1predicate-name', •argument' from 'argument-name', or 
'argument' from 1variable'. The distinctions which the logicians 
require are explained in Hans Reichenbach, Elements of Symbolic 
Logic, The Free Press (paperback) 1966, esp. pp. 80-83. 
The abstract study of predicates allows us, first of all, to 
describe each predicate according to 1he number of arguments that 
are associated with it. Such a description may be thought of as 
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analogous to a classification of predicate-words in natural 
language according to the number of nouns they require in a 
syntactically complete expression. 
A predicate with one argument, symbolically representable 
as (1), 3 has the simple predicate adjective or intransitive verb 
(1) p 
a 
3The notation with P for predicate and subscripted items 
for the arguments is used here in place of the more familiar f(x), 
partly to relieve the reader of the expectations associated with 
the standard notations of the functional calculus (see fn. 2), 
partly because parentheses will be introduced later for another 
purpose. 
as natural language correlates. That is, interpreting TALL or 
SLEEP as one-argument (or 'one-place') predicates, we can express 
the assertions that John is tall'or that John is sleeping by 
notations (2) or (3) respectively. 4 
(2) TALL JOHN 
(3) SLEEPJOHN 
4The reader is asked for the purposes of this essay, to 
consider the meaning of predicate expressions independently of 
matters of time. 
A two-place predicate, a predicate with two arguments, may 
be represented in its abstract form as (4). 
(4) p a,b 
An expression of this type names a relation that holds between 
two objects, the two objects identified here as.! and bin that 
order. A two-place predicate is used to assert a relation 
between two entities, and the left-to-right position of the 
symbols that identify those entities can be thought of as 
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indicating the separate roles they have in respect to the 
given relation. Two-place predicates are analogous to the or-
dinary transitive verbs of natural languages. 
As an example of a two-place predicate taken from natural 
language, we might consider the relation symbolized as {5) 
( 5) HITHARRY, MARY 
as representing the claim that in an act of hitting, Harry is 
the one who did it and Mary is the one who felt it. Viewed as 
an abstract relation, of course, it is irrelevant which role in 
a hitting situation is assigned to the left element, which to the 
right. The order presented here was chosen because it matches 
that of the subject and object noun-phrases in the corresponding 
active sentence in English. 
Three-place predicates, symbolizable as (6), 
(6) p 
a,b,c, 
correspond to grammatical constructions of the transitive indirect-
object type. An expression like (7) 
( 7) G IV~ARRY, MARY, A FLOWER 
can be interpreted as identifying, in an act of giving, the 
giver, the receiver, and the gift. 
2. Within symbolic logic itself there are essentially three 
areas in which the properties of predicates can be explored: 
these we may call the extensional, the intensional, and the 
definitional. Predicates are described extensionally as the 
sets of objects, or sets of pairs or triples of objects, etc., 
for which the relationships or properties in question hold true. 
They may be described intensionally according to such criteria 
as whether, for a predicate that holds true of a and bin that 
order, it necessarily holds true of~ and.!. in that order, too. 
We shall return to the extensional and intensional properties of 
predicates later; but first we shall consider the ways in which 
predicates may be related to each other by definition. 
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Because of the use of linear order in representations of 
multiplace predicates, it is possible for two predicates to 
differ from each other only in the left-to-right sequence of the 
arguments. That is, it is possible to recognize two two-place 
predicates as identical to each other, except that the first 
position of one corresponds to the second position of the other, 
and conversely. Predicates related in this way are known as 
'converses' of each other. 
Thus we might wish to define some two-place predicate P 
as being identical with some other two-place predicate P', 
except that the arguments are mentioned in the opposite order. 
See (8). 
(8) p - pt 
a,b - b,a 
In looking for natural language counterparts to converse predi-
cates, we can take the first and second positions as matching 
the subject and direct object positions of simple sentences. 
In this way we might note that the English verbs LIKE and PLEASE 
( in one sense of the latter) can be viewed as converses of each 
other. Note sentences (9) and (10). 
(9) MARY LIKES THE FLOWER. 
(10) THE FLOWER PLEASED MARY. 
Or, to take a relationship expressed by something other than a 
verb, we might note that WIFE and HUSBAND are converses of each 
other. Sentence (11) is true just in case sentence (12) is 
true. 
(11) HARRY rs A HUSBAND OF MARY. 
(12) MARY IS A WIFE OF HARRY. 
The term •converse' has teen mainly used in connection 
with two-place predicates, but one can easily define converse-
like relationships between predicates taking more than two 
arguments. One could, for example. define some seven-place 
predicate Pas identical with some other seven-place predicate 
P• except that the first argument of one corresponds to the 
fourth argument of the other. That particular relationship 
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between predicates, however, has little linguistic interest. 
There appear to be just two additional converse-type relation-
ships that have counterparts in the system of English verbs. 
First, there are three-place predicates in which the first and 
third positions are reversed; second, there are three-place 
predicates in which the second and third positions are reversed. 
For the first of these, note definition (13). 
(13) P - p, 
a,b,c - c,b,a 
Two conceptually identical three-place predicates differ only 
in the order in which the arguments are mentioned, the first 
position in the one corresponding to the third position in the 
other, and conversely. If we take the first and second posi-
tions as analogous to subject and object, as before, the third 
as analogous to the object of a preposition, we can see that the 
two English verbs BUY and SELL fit this pattern. Note the 
paraphrase --or near paraphrase--relations between (14) and (15): 
(14) SCHWARTZ SOLD THE FLOWER TO HARRY. 
(15) HARRY BOUGHT THE FLOWER FROM SCHWARTZ. 
The second converse-like relationship between three-place 
predicates shows the second and third positions reversed. 
Notice definition (16). 
(16) p = p, 
a,b,c a,c,b 
Making the same connections between position and grammatical 
function as before, we note that the English verbs ROB and 
STEAL fit this pattern. Note sentences (17) and (18). 
(17) CLYDE ROBS BANKS OF MONEY. 
(18) CLYDE STEALS MONEY FROM BANKS. 
In the cases of LIKE vs. PLEASE, BUY vs. SELL, ROB vs. 
STEAL, we had different verbs. Our language also has ways of 
expressing these same converse-like relationships with identical 
verbs, where the difference between the predicates is made 
overt only in the choice of the preposition that marks the last 
item. A two-place predicate for which this is true is found 
- 6 -
in the verb SWARM. This verb refers to an activity of a 
collection of objects, an activity that has to be conceived of 
as occupying or occurring in some kind of space. It happens 
that either the objects or the place can be mentioned first 
(i.e., as subject), the remaining item being marked by one or 
another preposition. Notice the sentences (19) and (20): 
(19) BEES SWARM IN THE GARDEN. 
(20) THE GARDEN SWARMS WITH BEES. 
For an example of a pair of predicates analogous to BUY 
and SELL but differing, not in the verb but in the preposition 
that goes with the third argument, we may take sentences with 
the verb RENT. Compare (21) and (22). 
(21) HARRY RENTED THE HOUSE FROM SHEILA. 
(22) SHEILA RENTED THE HOUSE TO HARRY. 
Analogous to the pair ROB and STEAL we may take the verb BLAME. 
Compare (23) and (24): 
(23) HARRY BLAMED HIS FAILURES ON MARY. 
(24) HARRY BLAMED MARY FOR HIS FAILURES. 
Relations between verbs that are like the converse rela-
tions of the theory of predicates involve position-switching 
for subject and object, as with LIKE and PLEASE; between subject 
and prepositional object in an intransitive verb expression, as 
with SWARM; between subject and prepositional object in a transi-
tive verb expression, as with BUY and SELL, or RENT; and between 
direct object and prepositional object, as with ROB and STEAL, 
or BLAME. 
A second definitional device for expressing connections 
between predicates makes it possible to show one predicate as 
being conceptually a part of another. Each of the definitions 
given as (25) .nd (26) expresses an identity between a predi-
cate ·, and another, complex expression containing the predi-
cate P. 
(25) p, - P" [ p J a,b,c - a, b,c . 
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(26) P' = P" [Pb] a,b a, 
In the first case. a two-place predicate is seen as definitionally 
part of the meaning of a three-place predicate; in the second 
case, a one-p~ace predicate is definitionally part of a two-
place predicate. 
The relation between the .English verbs KILL and DIE, or 
that between the verbs PERSUADE and BELIEVE, can be expressed 
definitionally through an intermediate predicate, CAUSE. Notice 
the definitions given as (27) and (28). 
( 27 J PERSUADE a, b, c = CAUSE a, GELIEV¾, c J 
(28) KILLa,b = CAUSEa, [nr¾] 
In these cases, a connection between two predicates involves a 
third mediating predicate: here it is the two-place predicate 
CAUSE, a relation that holds between an object and a predication. 
Another definitional device capable of relating predicates 
fhat take different numbers of arguments makes use of the 
/suppression of, or failure to mention, one of the arguments. 
I 
/Thus, some one-place predicates might be definitionally related 
i 
·to a particular two-place predicate, except that the one-place 
predicate in question ignores (or presupposes) one of the 
relevant arguments. A notation that might be preposed for such 
a definition is given as (29) 5 
(29) p : pt A 
a a,b 
5The expression to the right of the equality sign in (29) 
may be taken as an abbreviation for (3 b)P'a,b, where the 
argument term bis taken as a variable bound by the existen-
tial quantifier 3. 
and may be read as follows: to say P of an object a is to say 
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that there is some object .,2. for which the predication P holds 
for a and bin that order. - -
We may take the English adjective MARRIED as a one-place 
predicate conceptually based on an inherently two-place predi-
cate. That is, to say that Harry is married is to say that 
there is somebody who is Harry's spouse, without saying who 
that person is. Marriage necessarily involves two entities, 
but the adjective MARRIED allows us to make statements about 
this relationship while mentioning only one of the parties. 
There are, then, these two ways of defining relationships 
between predicates that take different numbers of arguments. 
Either a superficially complex or multi-termed predicate may 
be presented as definitionally built out of simpler predicates, 
or superficially simple predicates may be presented as defini-
tionally built out of more complex predicates. In reconstruct-
ing relations between verbs that differ in the number of nouns 
they ntake", it is not always obvious which of these devices 
is most appropriate. Consider, for example, the relatedness 
between sentences (30) and (31): 
(30) THE WINDOW BROKE. 
(31) THE ROCK BROKE THE WINDOW. 
One might assume that BREAK is an inherently simple or one-
place predicate and that hence the two-place predicate seen 
in (31) involves an intermediate notion of causation. 
Alternatively, we might just as well assume that BREAK is an 
inherently two-place predicate, and that in the first sentence 
the speaker merely fails to mention--possibly because he does 
not know--what was instrumental in doing damage to the window. 
Without grounding an account of the semantic structure of 
words in a general empirical theory of semantic structures 
in natural lang .;ges, the linguist can find no principled 
way for pref .. rring one or another of these alternatives. 
A predicate is described extensionally as the set of all 
of the objects, or ordered sequences of objects, that the 
predicate can be truthfully asserted of. Thus, for (32) 
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(32) HIT a,b 
we may describe the predicate by identifying those pairs of 
things which, when put in place of the.!! and.!?, of the formula, 
yield true statements. It should be made clear that to the 
logician, the identification of these objects is in fact the 
definition of the predicate. 
Thus if it is true that Mike hit Billy Smith's nose, then 
the pair of objects, Mike and Billy Smith's nose (mentioned 
in that order) constitutes one segment of the extension of the 
two-place predicate HIT. It will probably be immediately clear 
that an extensional definition is of little value to the linguist, 
because he is not concerned with the factuality of (33) 
(33) MIKE HIT BILLY SMITH'S NOSE. 
but with what the sentence can mean. 
One might propose that although extension in the strictest 
sense fails to capture what speakers of a language know about 
the predicate words they use, a closer approximation to that 
knowledge may be constructed by considering the collections of 
objects that can conceivably enter into the predications in 
question. The emptiness of this proposal becomes clear when 
we consider that any understanding of the collections of 
objects that are conceivably related to the meaning of a given 
predicate presupposes an understanding of the meaning of that 
predicate, and not the other way around. If there is anything 
strange about sentence (34), 
(34) THE MOSQUITO SWALLOWED THE VICE PRESIDENT. 
we will accredit this strangeness to the fact that the body 
of the politician in question exceeds certain required dimen-
sions, or to our knowledge that mosquitoes are not equipped 
to perform deeds of the type we could really call swallowing. 
Judgments about conceivable occurrence as arguments in the 
predicate depend, in other words 1 on our understanding of the 
predicate notion--not the other way around. It seems to me 
that no use of the extensional properties of predicates can 
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serve us in identifying linguistically interesting properties 
of verbs. 
As intensional properties of predicates the theory of 
predicates has developed such notions as symmetry, reflexivitz)) 
and transitivitz. A two-place predicate is symmetric if, . 
whenever it holds for.! and .E. in that order, it holds for .E. 
and.! in that order, too. We might think of the verb TOUCH 
as symmetric: if.! touches .E,, .E. necessarily touches.!• The 
verb OUTGROW is not like that: if.! outgrew .E,, then .E. definite-
ly did not outgrow.!• OUTGROW is antisymmetric. The verb 
LOVE is neither. If.! loves~. b may or may not love.!• LOVE 
is mesosymmetric. 
A two-place predicate is reflexive if whenever the same 
object is mentioned in both positions, the predicate necessarily 
holds. The English verb EQUAL is reflexive, because anything 
equals itself. The verb DIFFER-FROM is antireflexive, a cannot 
differ from.!• LOVE is mesoreflexive: it is possible, but not 
inescapable, that a person loves himself. 
A predicate is transitive (in the logician's sense) if 
from the fact that the predicate holds for.! and .E. as well as 
for band c, it necessarily holds for a and c as well. The - - - - ' 
English verb EXCEED is transitive: if.! exceeds .E. and .E. exceeds 
_£,then.! necessarily exceeds.£• The verb SIRE is antitransi-
tive; if.! sired .E. and .E. sired_£, then.! necessarily did not 
sire c. The verb LOVE, again, is neither. It is mesotransi-
tive. If Harry loves Mary, and Mary loves Schwartz, it is not 
inescapably true that Harry loves Schwartz. 
3. An attempt to see how the notions that have just been 
reviewed can be used in characterizing expressions containing 
verbs may begin with a consideration of sentences (35)-(37). 
(35) PETER TOUCHED THE WINDOW. 
(36) PETER STRUCK THE WINDOW. 
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(37) PETER BROKE THE WINDOW. 
Intensionally, the verbs TOUCH, STRIKE and BREAK are all 
alike: like most two-noun verbs, they are simply mesosymmetric, 
mesotransitive and mesoreflexive. Extensionally, they cannot 
be distinguished from each other appropriately. If we take 
extension in the narrow sense, no verb has an extension that 
stays the same from one moment to the next, and the sense in 
which (35) and (;6) are alike (as opposed to (37)) cannot be 
revealed. If we take extension in the broader sense, there is 
no possibility of distinguishing (35) and (36) from each other. 
Presumably anything that can be conceived of as striking some-
thing can be conceived of as touching it, and vice versa. 
Definitionally, the verb BREAK of (37), is related to a 
one-term predicate, namely that exemplified in (38). 
(38) THE WINDOW BROKE. 
but there is no associated one-term predicate corresponding, 
in the same way, to the verbs TOUCH and STRIKE of (35) and 
( 36). 
Conceptually, BREAK differs from TOUCH and STRIKE in 
what one must assume about the nature of the second argument. 
While it may be true that (39) and (40) are both acceptable 
English sentences, the second noun does not identify the same 
set of arguments. (40) seems to require an understanding 
that the dog in question has been frozen, or is perhaps not 
a dog but an object in the shape of a dog. 
(39) PETER TOUCHED THE DOG. 
(40) PETER BROKE THE DOG. 
The verb, in short, seems to require of its second argument--
the entity named by the direct object noun phrase--that it be 
rigid in some of its dimensions. There is evidently no straight-
forward way in which such information about expressions con-
taining verbs can be presented if we limit ourselves to concepts 
of the type we have been discussing. 
In all three of the sentences (35)-(37) one can detect an 
ambiguity in respect to the role played by PETER. The person 
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Peter might have been the responsible agent for these activities, 
doing something to the window with, say, a gun butt. Or 
Peter--that is, Peter's body--might himself~ the object that 
came into contact with the window: somebody may have pushed him 
into it. 
The way in which each of these expressions is ambiguous 
relates to the different roles that arguments can have with 
respect to a predicate, roles that the predicate calculus is 
only capable of identifying, separately for each predicate, in 
terms of position. One could of course ascribe the ambiguity 
to the verb itself, or one could say that each of these verbs 
matches phonetically two distinct predicates. But that is to 
accept defeat. 
I would like to suggest that we can get out of these 
difficulties by making use of a new order of concepts. These 
concepts will enable us to say that sentences (35)-(37) are 
ambiguous with respect to our understanding of the role played 
by the object identified as PE.'TER, and furthermore, that the 
roles by which they are said to be ambiguous are the same in 
all three cases; that is, that in all three sentences we 
understand Peter as being the active agent, or Peter's body as 
the 'used' instrument, in the performance of the act. It is 
true, of course, that within the predicate theory of logic 
one could state that the first-position arguments for the 
sentence with STRIKE are the same as those for TOUCH, and 
one could define the relationships these hold to the predicate 
as a whole to be the same, but there is simply no direct way 
of showing, within the calculus of predicates, that there is 
some kind of identity in the meanings of the sentences with 
STRIKE and TOUCH, the difference between them having to do 
with the meanings of these verbs and relating to something 
like relative intensity of impact. 
The added concepts will allow us to say that the semantic 
relation between BREAK and THE WlNDOW is the same in (37) and 
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(38), the surface difference between the two sentences being 
relatable to the number of roles that are given overt expression. 
The new concepts will allow us to state directly the under-
lying identity of three-noun expressions with BUY and SELL, as 
with ROB and STEAL, so that we can say that the differences 
between them are surface differences in the order in which the 
arguments are mentioned, and in the grammatical function--as 
subject, direct object, or prepositional obJect--that is obliga-
torily assum:d by the nouns that name the objects that fill 
b 
these rol~s. 
6The character of the underlying identity of expressions in 
BUY and SELL is in the understood system of relationships involv-
ing two persons or institutions and the transfer, from one to the 
other, of some property or service, in one direction, and a sum 
of money, in the other. The verbs differ in other ways, and so 
the sentences containing them cannot be exact paraphrases of each 
other. The differences relate to identity of the voluntary 
participant in the purchasing act, and the like. For an in-
sightful discussion of the impossibility, on semantic and 
syntactic grounds, of regarding BUY and SELL as suppletive vari-
ants of the same verb, see Jeffreys. Gruber, Studies in Lexical 
Relations, M.I.T. Ph.D. Dissertation (1962), esp. Chapt. 3, 
Sec. 3 and Chapt. 8. 
It is clear that the concepts I have been alluding to are 
sharply distinct from those properties of surface form and 
linear sequence that we associate with traditional grammatical 
terms like 'subject• and 'object•. Instead of identifying the 
•undergoer• role of the activity symbolized by BREAK as that of 
the only argument of BREAK when used as a one-place predicate 
and that of the second argument of BREAK used as a two-place 
predicate, my proposal is that we label this role directly. 
In order for such a decision to reflect an empirical claim 
about human language, it must be assumed that there is some 
fixed collection of role types to draw from, and that these 
recur in different expressions. I believe that the recur-
rence of role types in at least the three sentences we have 
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seen may be considered demonstrated. A part of the descrip-
tion of a verb, then, is a list of the various distinct roles 
which entities may assume in expressions containing it. We 
can leave to the theory of syntax an account of the ways in 
which the words which name these entities are to be given 
surface syntactic functions. 
I believe that human languages are constrained in such 
a way that the relations between arguments and predicates 
fall into a small number of types. In particular, I believe 
that these role types can be identified with certain quite 
elementary judgments about the things that go on aroun4 us: 
judgments about who does something, who experiences something, 
who benefits from something, where something happens, what it 
is that changes, what it is that moves, where it starts out, 
and where it ends up. Since judgments like these are very 
much like the kinds of things grammarians have associated for 
centuries with the uses of grammatical 'cases', I have been 
referring to these roles as case relationships, or, simply, 
cases. 7 
7see, in particular, my paper "The case for case," in 
Universals in Linguistic Theort, eds. E. Ba.ch and R. Harms, 
Bolt, Rinehart and Winston; 19 8, pp. 
An analogy may help to make clear what I am claiming about 
constraints on natural language sentences. Suppose that we 
view the idea expressed by a simple sentence as analogous to 
a scene in a play, and suppose that we think of speakers of a 
language as dramatists working within a theatrical tradition 
that limits itself to a fixed number of role types, with the 
further constraint that at most one character in a given role 
type may appear in any given scene. The troupe has hats with 
tassels of different colors for these different roles, and 
there is only one hat of each type. Any scene may contain 
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zero or one character in each of the following roles: a prince, 
a villain, a hag, a clown, a sought-after beautiful virgin 
princess, and a messenger boy. Different character types can 
fill these roles--the villain may be tall or short, white or 
. black, handsome or ugly--but each scene uses at most one of 
each of these roles. 
Certain identities can be recognized in scenes that use 
different numbers of characters. In one scene the messenger 
boy, alone on the stage, falls flat on his face. In a second 
scene, the clown accidentally bumps into the messenger boy, 
and the messenger boy falls flat on his face. What the 
messenger boy does in these two scenes is exactly the same. 
A third scene has the villain pushing the clown into the 
messenger boy, the messenger boy then falling flat on his face. 
What the messenger boy does in this scene is the same as what 
he does in the first two, and what the clown does in this scene 
is the same thing that he did in the second scene. There is 
another scene that has only the villain and the messenger boy 
on the stage. The villain does something and the messenger 
boy falls down, but the audience does not see what it is that 
the villain does. (I might point out that one version or 
school of the theatrical tradition I am telling you about 
requires that whenever the villain is on stage, he appears 
to the audience's left. There are other versions of this 
tradition which fail to impose such a requirement, or which 
have different but similar ones.) 
4. We may now clear the stage in order to examine some of the 
ways in which case concepts can be called on to describe the 
syntactic and semantic characteristics of certain English verbs. 
Let us begin with the verb HIT. 
Conceptually the verb HIT requires an understanding of 
some object and a place where this object achieves contact. 
(The reader might be m~re pleased if l were to state that the 
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meaning of HIT involves merely the coming into contact of two 
objects. It must be recalled that I am committed to viewing 
two objects associated with a v~ro as appearing, somehow, in 
different roles.) We may refer to the two roles associated 
with HIT as Instrument and Place respectively. 
The basic concept requires an understanding of an object 
coming into contact with something, but it happens also to be 
true that simple expressions using this verb may contain 
mention of an animate being that is responsible for an act 
of hitting. Another role that is compatible with uses of the 
verb HIT, in other words, is that of an Agent. We can 
symbolize these observations with the notation given in (41), 
(~) HIT 
Place, Instrument (Agent) 
where the subscripted terms are names of roles that arguments 
can play with respect to the predicate HIT. The expression in 
parentheses indicates that the Agent role is optional. 
To say that the Agent role is not an obligatory component 
of the meaning of expressions with HIT is to agree that in a 
sentence like (42) 
(42) THE ROCK HIT THE TREE. 
one may quite well be referring to what happened when a rock 
rolled down a hill, completely without any implication of out-
side agency. 
Conceptually, as we have seen, the Agent is an unnecessary 
part of expressions containing HIT. Syntactically, certain 
conceptually present roles may be 'suppressed' under certain 
conditions. For example, when an Agent is identified, it is 
not obligatory to mention the Instrument. Thus, we may under-
stand sentence (43) 
(43) JOHN HIT THE WINDOW. 
as meaning that John, as Agent, was responsible for an occur-
rence of the kind of contact indicated by the verb HIT. The 
implement is not mentioned, but its absence is of a different 
order from that of the Agent in {42); conceptually, the 
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instrumental relation is present in {43), because a sentence 
like l44) 
(44) JOHN HIT THE WINDOW, BUT HE DIDN'T HIT IT 
WITH ANYTHING. 
is semantically anomalous. 
It is a fact of F.nglish syntax that if both lnstrument 
and Agent are identified in sentences containing the verb 
HIT, the Instrument shows up as the tnird thing mentioned, 
marked off with the preposition WITH. Notice sentence (45). 
(45) JOHN HIT THE WINDOW WITH A SHOESTRING. 
However, if only the Instrument and the Place are mentioned, 
as in (43), the Instrument shows up, not as the object of the 
preposition WITH, but as the subject of the sentence. The 
facts, then, that one may identify the Agent without indicating 
the Instrument, and that the Instrument may be mentioned with-
out implying an Agent, account for the ambiguity of the earlier 
sentences about Peter doing things to the window. 
If the place is "understood", from the context, the verb 
HIT may be used with the Instrument alone. Thus a sentence 
like (46) 
(46) THE BULLET HIT. 
is usable whenever it is not necessary to indicate the Place. 
Notice that mention of the Place can be omitted when the sub-
ject is the Instrument, but not when the subject is the Agent. 
That is, there is no sentence of the type (47) 
( 47) PETER HIT. 
where the sense is that Peter hit the target with an arrow, 
say, and the Instrument and Place are perfectly well under-
stood from the context of utterance. 
English syntax allows the noun indicating the place to 
appear in first or subject position if the verbal expression 
is converted to its passive form. If only the Place is 
mentioned, the passive form is required. Sentence (48) 
(48) THE TARGET WAS HIT. 
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is a way of expressing that an act of hitting took place, 
while only mentioning the Place. When either the Agent or 
Instrument is mentioned, it is marked by an appropriate 
preposition. If the Agent is mentioned, it is marked by the 
preposition BY. Notice sentence (49). 
(49) THE TARGET WAS HIT BY HARRY. 
When the Instrument is mentioned, the choice of preposition 
depends on whether the notion of Agent is conceptually present 
or not. If the event involves only an Instrument and a Place, 
the Instrument noun is marked with the preposition BY; if the 
event involves an Agent, however, even when the noun that 
would identify the Agent is not syntactically present, the 
Instrument noun is marked with the preposition WITH. Notice 
the difference between (50) and (51): 
(50) THE WINDOW WAS HIT BY A BRANCH. 
(51) THE WINDOW WAS HIT WITH A BRANCH. 
(There is a certain amount of indeterminacy in these general-
izations. The careful reader may have noticed that I said of 
the Agent that it was marked.&, the preposition BY, of the 
Instrument that it was marked~ the preposition WITH.) 
All of these observations are facts that speakers of 
English know about the verb HIT. It is not true, of course, 
that they are all idiosyncratic facts about that single 
verb. They happen also to apply to the verbs STRIKE and 
TOUCH, and a few others, as well. 
We turn now to a verb of a slightly different type, the 
verb BREAK. The ambiguity we saw first in the sentences about 
people hitting, touching and striking windows was matched, as 
we saw, by that of sentence (37). 
(37) PETER BROKE THE WINDOW. 
That is, either Peter's body was instrumentally involved in 
damaging the window, or Peter used something (possibly a 
part of his body) to damage the window. This suggests that 
the surface subject of active transitive simple sentences 
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with BREAK can represent either an Agent or an Instrument. The 
fact that (52) 
(52) PETER BROKE THE WINDOW WITH A GUN-BUTT. 
is not ambiguous suggests that, as with HIT, BREAK allows both 
Agent and Instrument to be expressed in the same sentence, but 
requires, in that case, that the Agent appear as the subject 
and that the Instrument appear as the object of the preposition 
WITH. A property that distinguishes BREAK from the other verbs 
is that there are syntactically and semantically complete 
sentences which mention neither Instrument nor Agent. Recall 
sentence (38), 
(38) THE WINDOW BROKE. 
where the same relationship between the window and the predicate 
holds as in the sentences where THE WINDOW is the direct object. 
The analogous sentence (53) 
(53) THE WINDOW HIT. 
is not acceptable. This difference is apparently relatable 
to the fact that BREAK is an inherently one-place predicate, 
while HIT is an inherently two-place predicate. Another 
difference between them is that while HIT can occur with the 
Instrument only, the Place being understood from the context 
(recall sentence (46)), the analogous possibility does not 
exist with BREAK. To express the information that the hammer 
broke the window is the context where everybody knows what it 
is that got damaged, the speaker of English is not free to 
omit the direct object and say merely (54): 
(54) THE HAMMER BROKE. 
We can summarize these facts by saying that the verb BREAK 
is inherently a one-place predicate, that the role which is 
obligatorily expressed with it is one that can be given the 
label Object (for want of a better word), and that expressions 
containing this verb assert of the noun identified as Object a 
certain kind of change of state from a whole to a damaged 
condition. The verb can be used with an Instrument or an 
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Agent, under the restriction that an Agent is tolerated only if 
there is conceptually an Instrument present. The formula given 
in (55) summarizes these observations: 
{55) BREAK . ObJect (Instrument (Agent)) 
As with expressions containing HIT, the same conditions hold 
for choice of subject, choice of prepositions, and use of the 
passive form. 
In addition to the differences already mentioned, there is 
another one which relates to the roles I have identified as Object 
and Place. The decision to assign these labels finds some support 
in the fact that there are languages which use a Locative case 
ending for nouns that go with verbs of hitting, Accusative case 
endings with nouns that go with verbs that refer to breaking. A 
syntactic distinction shows up in English when the noun in question 
is the name of a body part. Body part nouns can be used to identify 
places or objects. Where they identify places, but not otherwise, 
there are in English paraphrase relations between genitive con-
structions and constructions containing locative phrases. For 
example, (56) is a paraphrase of (57), 
(56) SCHWARTZ HIT HARRY'S NOSE. 
(57) SCHWARTZ HIT HARRY IN THE NOSE. 
but there is no such paraphrase relation between (58) and (59). 
(58) SCKNARTZ BROKE HARRY'S NOSE. 
(59) •SCHWARTZ BROKE HARRY IN THE NOSE. 
The facts that came to light about the roles that could be 
associated with HIT are not idiosyncratic facts about HIT; they 
apply also, with some variation, to some other verbs of surface 
contact like SLAP, STRIKE, BUMP, SMITE, and TOUCH. The facts 
that were brought up in connection with BREAK apply equally well 
to other change-of-state verbs like BEND, FOLD, SHATTER, and 
CRACK. Many of them, in short, appear to be general facts about 
English, rather than facts that need to be registered separately 
in the lexical entries for each verb. 
Examples of a different sort are expressions containing the 
verbs ROB and STEAL. Both of these words are used in connection 
with the same type of activities, and both of them 
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conceptually relate to three things: the being who does it, 
the being or institution that suffers a loss, and the object 
or objects that change ownership. Easic to the sense of each 
vero are the notion of transfer of ownership without permission 
of the original owner, and the notion of illegality. The 
three ro.Les may be identified as the familiar Agent and Object 
for the performer and the object that is transferred from one 
owner to another, and Dative for the person or institution 
that experiences the loss. In general the case concept Dative 
refers to the being or institution that experiences something 
or bas something happen to it. 
Both of the verbs ROB and STEAL conceptually require an 
understanding of all three ro.Les. They differ from each other 
in that ROB allows the speaker to mention only the Agent and 
tne Dative (leaving the Object unspecified) and STEAL allows 
him to mention only the Agent and the Object (leaving the 
Dative unspecified). The syntactically basic elements show 
up as subject and object in each case, the optional element 
appearing, if at all, as object of a preposition. Because 
of these options, the verbs ROB and STEAL allow one to see 
very clearly that there is an essential difference between 
syntactic roles and the meanings of the nouns that fill 
these roles. Compare sentences (60) and (61). 
(60) HARRY ROBBED A CASINO. 
(61) HARRY STOLE A CASINO. 
In each case the non-required role can be mentioned, in the 
form of a preposition phrase. Notice sentences (62) and (63). 
(62) HARRY ROBBED A CASINO OF ITS SILVER. 
(63) HARRY STOLE A CASI.NO FROM HOWARD HUGHES. 
These two verbs allow other options as well. If one 
wishes to mention only the Dative element, one uses the 
passive of ROB, as in (64). 
(64) THE CASINO WAS ROBBED. 
If one wishes to mention only the Object element, one uses 
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the passive of STEAL as in (65). 
(65) THE SILVER WAS STOLEN. 
If one wishes t~ mention only the Agent, indicating the activity 
of taking things from people as a typical or professional 
activity, one may use the verb STEAL, as in (66). 
(66) HARRY STEALS. 
The verb ROB does not allow us that luxury. 
The analogy with the drama is suggestive for simple verbal 
expressions, but there is one other 'role' that we find assoc-
iated with verbs, and that is the role provided by an embedded 
sentence (a play within a play). One might wish to say of the 
verb BELIEVE that it takes a Proposition as one of its argu-
ments, and a Dative as the other. In a sentence like (67), 
for example, 
(67) MARY BELIEVES THAT HARRY IS A GENIUS. 
the predicate BELIEVE takes two arguments, one the experiencer 
of the belief, the other the content of the belief. The verb 
PERSUADE has the same central sense as BELIEVE, but PERSUADE 
requires syntactically an Instrument or an Agent. Thus a 
sentence like (68) 
(68) HIS SMILE PERSUADED MARY THAT HARRY WAS A GENIUS. 
identifies the Instrument or stimulus responsible for this 
change of state, while (70) identifies Schwartz as the Agent. 
(70) SCHWARTZ PERSUADED MARY THAT HARRY WAS A GENIUS. 
5. It would be possible to go on at some length exploring 
the semantic and grammatical properties of individual verbs, 
and if we did we would continue to find semantic and grammati-
cal properties which different verbs share. I should like 
now, however, to itemize a few of the various facts about 
verbs that a complete theory of lexical informations will 
have to account for. I conceive of a lexicon as a list of 
minimally redundant descriptions of the syntactic, semantic 
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and phonological properties of lexical items, accompanied by 
a system of redundancy rules, the latter conceivable as a set 
of instructions on how to interpret the lexical entries. In 
what follows I shall make no attempt to sort out from each 
other those types of facts which must be recorded as idio-
syncratic information about specific verbs and those which 
are best seen as instances of general facts about whole classes 
of verbs. It may be a long while before such distinctions can 
be sorted out with any subtlety. 
First, there is what we might wish to call the basic or 
central sense of a verb. For HIT and TOUCH, there is the 
matter of surface contact, the difference in meaning between 
the two verbs having to do with intensity of impact. For ROB 
and STEAL there are the notions of transfer of ownership and 
illegality. 8 The verb BURGLARIZE adds to that the notion of 
8To some speakers, expressions with STEAL contain implica-
tions of stealth or secrecy. 
forcible entry. 
Second, it is necessary to specify the number and the nature 
of the roles--the 'cases'--that are conceptually inherent to 
the basic sense of the verb. These roles, I have suggested, can 
be identified by terms like Agent, Instrument, Object, Place, 
etc., and are thus freed from matters of left-to-right position. 
BREAK requires one case, the Object that undergoes the change 
of state. HIT requires two cases, ROB or STEAL require three. 
BUY and SELL require four cases, assuming that some reference 
to money is inherently a part of the meaning of these verbs. 
Third, certain verbs impose certain specific understandings 
onto one or another of their inherently associated arguments. 
BEI'l'D, for example, imposes an understanding of iroffering 
resistance" onto the Object. That is, when we hear a sentence 
like (71)) 
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(71) HE BENT HIS HANDKERCHIEF. 
we have to modify our usual understanding of the properties 
of handkerchiefs in order to make sense of it. The handker-
chief might be starched. Or consider the verb ASSASSINATE. 
The Dative element associated with this verb is understood as 
a person in some important political or religious position. 
Fourth, for certain verbs the nature of our understanding 
of one of the arguments is so clear that the argument itself 
need not be mentioned at all unless quite specific additional 
information is to be communicated. The typical Instrument 
associated with SLAP or KICK or KISS is a hand, a foot or a 
pair of lips respectively, but if the speaker of English has 
nothing special to say about these, he doesn't need to mention 
them. That is, we do not say (72), but we might say (73). 
(72) HE SLAPPED ME IN THE FACE WITH HIS HAND. 
(73) HE SLAPPED ME IN THE FACE WITH HIS MUDDY LEFT 
HAND. 
We seldom find it necessary to say (74), but we might have 
reason to say (75). 
(74) SHE KISSED ME WITH HER LIPS. 
(75) SHE KISSED ME WITH EAGER LIPS. 
Notice that these facts are not simply consequences of the 
specificity of the associated arguments. You can't STUB any-
thing but a toe, but you have to use a word that refers to 
one or more toes anyway. 9 
9What is at issue here is not whether SLAP obligatorily 
refers to hands--one can after all slap someone with a fish--
but whether there is some typically understood Instrument which 
need not be made explicit. 
Fifth, we need to indicate which non-inherent cases are 
compatible with the verb in a simple sentence. The notion Agent 
is not inherent to the basic sense of HIT, but an Agent may be 
expressed in simple expressions containing this verb anyway. 
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The same is not true of a verb like SLEEP. If one person is 
responsible for another person's sleeping, English requires 
an expression with two verbs as in (76). 
(76) THEY MADE ME SLEEP. 
Sixth, we need in general to indicate which of the cases 
need to be expressed and which can be suppressed. As I 
suggested earlier, although Instrument and Place are notions 
inherent to HIT, one doesn't need to mention the Instrument 
in a sentence that identifies the Agent, and one doesn't need 
to mention the Place if there is no Agent and the identity of 
the Place is known from the context. This is characteristic 
of some surface-contact verbs, but not all. 
Seventh, it is necessary to know, for each verb, which 
cases can show up as the subject of a sentence, which as direct 
object. Recall that the verb RENT, used actively, allows 
different things to appear as subject, BLAME allows different 
things to appear as object. 
Eighth, it is necessary to indicate, for those elements 
that do not show up as surface subjects or objects, what preposi-
tions go with which noun phrases. For some other languages we 
would here be referring to the government of specific case 
categories by specific verbs. Statements on the choice of 
specific prepositions for particular roles in construction with 
given verbs are analogous, in other words, to such statements 
as that Latin UTOR takes the Ablative case, or German HELFEN 
takes the Dative case. 
Ninth, it is necessary, for some verbs, to know whether 
there are semantic facts that determine such matters as the 
choice of subject or choice of object. I suggested earlier--
incorrectly--that (19) and (20) are paraphrases of each other. 
(19) BEES SWARM IN THE GARDEN. 
(20) THE GARDEN SWARMS WITH BEES. 
While (20) suggests that the whole garden is full of bees, 
(19), being a generic statement about bees, does not. The 
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choice of surface subject, in other words, may, for some verbs, 
be linked with semantic facts about the sentences containing 
them. ~he same is true for some of the verbs that allow 
alternative choices of direct objects. Sentence (77) 
(77) HARRY SPRAYED PAINT ON THE WALL. 
is a near-paraphrase of (78) 
(78) HARRY SPRAYED THE WALL WITH PAINT. 
though the latter suggests that the whole wall got covered 
with paint, while the former does not. 
Tenth, it is necessary to know what modifications in the 
verb are called for in connection with each subject choice. 
Either tenant or landlord may appear as the subject of RENT 
in its active form, but the rented property, expressed as 
subject, calls for a passive form of the verb. With GIVE, 
only the giver may be mentioned as subject with the verb in 
its active form; the passive is called for when either gift or 
recipient is expressed in the subject position. 
6. Obviously, a child facing the task of learning to speak 
English does not have to learn this whole range of information 
item-by-item for each verb. Many of these facts appear to be 
instances of quite general properties of English as a whole, 
many are most probably explainable in terms of properties of 
human language in general. My purpose in this essay has been 
merely that of displaying the kinds of information that have 
to be accounted for one way or another and suggesting a frame-
work for describing these facts. 
My discussion has been limited to verbs, but the ideas 
are relevant to the descriptions of adjectives and nouns as 
well. Examples that one might start with in a case-grammar 
study of adjectives are the following: 
(79) APPLES ARE HEALTHY. 
(80) 
(81) 
HARRY IS HEALTHY. 
THE MOVIE WAS SAD. 
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(82) HARRY IS SAD. 
(83) HARRY IS CERTAIN TO FAIL. 
(84) SCHWARTZ IS CERTAIN THAT HARRY WILL FAIL. lO 
10Both HEALTHY and SAD are predicates that take Dative argu-
ments, but they may take Instruments--entities capable of bring-
ing about the state or experience referred to--as well. It 
happens that when these predicates take Instruments and the 
Dative element is generic or non-specific, the Dative element 
need not be mentioned. The adjective CERTAIN takes a Dative 
element and a Proposition. When the Dative element is syntacti-
cally realized, we get a sentence like (84) with the Dative noun 
appearing as subject, the Proposition as a that-clause comple-
ment of the adjective. When the Dative element is not present 
syntactically, an 'empty• subject may be chosen (matching {84) 
but with IT replacing SCHWARTZ), or the noun that would have 
been the subject of the embedded sentence becomes the subject 
of the whole sentence (as in (83)). In this latter case, the 
embedded Proposition appears as an infinitival complement to 
the predicate. 
Em.men Bach has recently suggested reasons for treating 
nouns as predicates, 11 and I find that many things that one can 
11Emmon Bach, "Nouns and noun phrases, 11 in E. Bach and R. 
Harms, eds., Universals in Linguistic Theory~ Holt, Rinehart, 
and Winston 1968 
say about the other more obvious predicate words apply to nouns 
as well. Recall that there is a difference between the basic 
meaning of the verb and the various kinds of understandings 
that verbs impose on the arguments that they take. This distinc-
tion, it seems to me, can be found in nouns as well. In this 
regard we may consider the only English noun that has so far 
been given a semantic analysis: BACHELOR. We have learned that 
the noun BACHELOR identifies something which is Male, Human, 
Adult and Unmarried. It seems to me that only Unmarried (or, 
more accurately, 'never before married') is the concept that 
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one would wish to associate directly with the meaning of 
BACHELOR, and that the other three properties make up part of 
our understanding of the nature of arguments that BACHELOR 
as a predicate can accept. 
Chomsky has recently discussed what he refers to as the 
· 12 "lexicalist" position on derived nouns. I believe that 
12Noam Chomsky, "Some remarks on nominalizatione,n to appear 
in R. Jacobs and P. S. Rosenbaum, eds., Studies in English Trans-
formational Grammar, 1g68. 
many of his proposals can be re-interpreted in case terms in a 
fairly straightforward way. 
I continue to think that the world must wait another two 
or three decades before it will see anything resembling a 
respectable grammar of English. I, at least, remain almost 
totally baffled by tenses, modals, determiners, quantifiers 
and adverbs. But I have the feeling that real progress can be 
made in understanding the elementary structure of the "proposi-
tional" core of simple sentences, and in understanding the 
semantic and syntactic properties of the major parts of speech, 
by abandoning a conception of syntax that restricts itself to 
categories and sequences in favor of a conception of syntax-
semantics that is based on a theory of the essential ways in 
which aspects of linguistically codable experiences are 
relatable to each other and to the experience as a whole. 
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